Bridge Security Risks and Major Hacks: How Cross-Chain Vulnerabilities Are Costing Millions

Bridge Security Risks and Major Hacks: How Cross-Chain Vulnerabilities Are Costing Millions
Nov, 6 2025

Between March 2022 and early 2025, over $2.8 billion in cryptocurrency was stolen through blockchain bridges. That’s not a typo. It’s more than the entire value lost in all other DeFi exploits combined. And yet, millions of users still use these bridges every day without a second thought. Why? Because they’re necessary. Without bridges, you can’t move ETH from Ethereum to Solana, or USDC from Polygon to Arbitrum. But every time you use one, you’re trusting code that has repeatedly failed - and failed spectacularly.

How Bridges Work (And Why They’re So Dangerous)

A blockchain bridge connects two separate blockchains. It lets you lock up your asset on one chain and receive an equivalent version on another. For example, you send 1 ETH to a bridge contract on Ethereum, and you get 1 wETH on Polygon. Simple, right? Not even close.

The problem isn’t complexity. It’s trust. Most bridges rely on one of three models - and each has a fatal flaw.

  • Validator-based bridges (like Ronin and Harmony) use a small group of trusted parties - often just 5 to 10 - to confirm transfers. If even a few of their private keys are stolen, the whole system collapses.
  • Wrapped asset bridges (like Wormhole) create fake versions of your assets. Instead of moving your real ETH, you get a token that’s supposed to represent it. But if the contract lets anyone mint those tokens without locking real collateral, you’re handing attackers a printing press.
  • Liquidity pool bridges (like Across) skip wrapped assets entirely. You get your real ETH back on the other chain. But they depend on a network of economic actors called relayers who are incentivized to behave honestly. If the incentives break, so does the bridge.
The Ronin Bridge hack in March 2022 showed how deadly validator-based models are. Attackers stole five out of nine validator keys. That’s it. Five keys. No fancy exploit. Just social engineering, phishing, and poor key management. The result? $624 million vanished in hours.

The Wormhole Hack: When a Single Line of Code Wiped Out $320 Million

The Wormhole hack in February 2022 didn’t need a thousand lines of malicious code. It needed one.

The bridge had a verification function that checked if a transaction was authorized. But there was a bug: if the verification failed, it didn’t stop the transaction. It just skipped the check. So an attacker sent a fake request with no signature - and the system said, "Okay, mint 120,000 wETH." That’s 120,000 fake tokens. Each worth over $2,600 at the time. The hacker turned them into real ETH on other chains and disappeared. The total loss? Over $320 million.

This wasn’t a hack of the blockchain. It was a hack of human assumptions. Developers assumed the verification step would always run. They never tested what happened if it didn’t. And no audit caught it.

Why Audits Don’t Work (And What Actually Does)

You’ve probably heard: "This bridge was audited by CertiK!" or "OpenZeppelin reviewed the code!"

So why do hacks keep happening?

Because audits are snapshots, not shields. Most happen once - before launch. They check for obvious bugs. They don’t simulate real-world attacks. They don’t test what happens when validators get compromised. They don’t stress-test incentive structures.

The Balancer exploit in 2025 cost $128 million. The bug? A rounding error in a math function. One line. A junior developer missed it. The audit firm didn’t catch it. The team didn’t test edge cases. And it took less than 30 minutes for someone to exploit it.

Real security doesn’t come from a PDF report. It comes from:

  • Multiple layers of verification
  • On-chain validator sets that rotate regularly
  • Signature aggregation to reduce attack surface
  • Formal verification - mathematically proving code behaves as intended
Only 28% of bridges use formal verification, according to Trail of Bits (2024). That’s a terrifying statistic.

A young girl casting a sealing spell to stop counterfeit tokens from bursting out of a glitching smart contract.

The Rise of AI-Powered Bridge Attacks

Hackers aren’t sitting around waiting for human mistakes anymore. AI is now scanning bridge code for vulnerabilities 37 times faster than any human team, according to Codebridge (2025).

AI doesn’t get tired. It doesn’t miss a typo. It doesn’t trust the developer’s comments. It looks for patterns: unused functions, unchecked inputs, weak randomness, upgradeable proxies. It finds them. And it automates the attack.

Google’s 2025 Cybersecurity Forecast predicts this trend will accelerate. Soon, AI won’t just find bugs - it’ll generate them. Imagine a bot that writes a fake bridge contract, deploys it, and tricks users into bridging assets to it. No phishing. No malware. Just a slightly prettier interface.

The days of "just avoid sketchy bridges" are over. Even the biggest names aren’t safe.

What’s Being Done? And Is It Enough?

Some projects are trying to fix this.

Chainlink’s CCIP (Cross-Chain Interoperability Protocol) doesn’t rely on a few validators. It uses decentralized oracles that pull data from multiple blockchains. It requires multiple independent signatures. It uses signature aggregation to reduce gas and increase security. It’s not perfect - but it’s designed to fail safely.

Across Protocol removed wrapped assets entirely. You don’t get wETH. You get real ETH. Their relayers stake money to ensure honesty. If they lie, they lose their stake. It’s economic security, not trust.

IBC (Inter-Blockchain Communication), used by Cosmos, is another alternative. It’s not a bridge - it’s a standardized protocol for chain-to-chain communication. No wrapped tokens. No centralized validators. Just cryptographic proofs.

But adoption is slow. Most DeFi projects still use the old, risky models because they’re cheaper to build and launch faster.

A protective circle of glowing oracles above a secure bridge, while AI owls scan for threats under a starry pink sky.

What You Can Do Right Now

You can’t stop hackers. But you can stop being an easy target.

  • Know which bridge you’re using. Check if it’s validator-based, wrapped-asset, or liquidity pool. Avoid the first two unless you’re comfortable with the risk.
  • Don’t bridge more than you can afford to lose. If you’re moving $50,000, you’re gambling. If you’re moving $500, you’re testing.
  • Wait 72 hours after a major bridge upgrade. Many hacks happen right after a "security patch." Hackers know devs make mistakes under pressure.
  • Use bridges with on-chain transparency. Can you see the validator set? The stake amounts? The transaction logs? If not, walk away.
  • Don’t trust "audited" as a guarantee. Look for projects using formal verification, multi-sig recovery, and decentralized relayers.

Why This Matters Beyond Your Wallet

Bridges aren’t just a technical problem. They’re a trust problem.

Every time a bridge gets hacked, people lose faith in crypto. Retail users get burned. Institutions pull back. Regulators tighten rules. The whole ecosystem suffers.

The $2.8 billion stolen isn’t just money. It’s credibility. It’s the reason Fortune 500 companies still won’t touch cross-chain tech. It’s why 68% of users now say bridge security is their top concern.

If we want blockchain to scale - if we want real adoption - we need to fix this. Not with better marketing. Not with bigger token rewards. But with better code. Better processes. Better accountability.

The next bridge hack isn’t a question of if. It’s a question of when.

Will you be ready?

What’s the most common cause of bridge hacks?

The most common cause is compromised validator keys or flawed verification logic. In validator-based bridges like Ronin, attackers steal private keys from a small group of trusted parties. In wrapped asset bridges like Wormhole, a bug in the smart contract allows unauthorized minting of fake tokens. Both exploit human assumptions - that keys are secure or that code will always check permissions.

Are all wrapped assets dangerous?

Not inherently, but they introduce a major risk: the ability to mint more than the real asset backing them. If the bridge contract doesn’t properly verify collateral, attackers can create infinite fake tokens. That’s why bridges like Across avoid wrapped assets entirely - they deliver real ETH, not wETH. Wrapped assets are a convenience, not a necessity - and the cost is higher trust.

Can audits prevent bridge hacks?

Audits help, but they’re not enough. Most audits are one-time, surface-level checks. They don’t simulate real attacks, test edge cases, or evaluate incentive structures. The Balancer and Wormhole hacks both passed audits. Real security requires formal verification, multi-layered validation, and continuous monitoring - not just a PDF report.

Which bridge models are the safest right now?

Liquidity pool models like Across Protocol are currently the safest because they don’t use wrapped assets and rely on economic incentives rather than centralized validators. Chainlink’s CCIP is also strong, using decentralized oracles and signature aggregation. IBC (used by Cosmos) is the most secure overall - but it’s only available for chains built on the Cosmos SDK. Avoid validator-based and wrapped-asset bridges unless you fully understand the risks.

Should I avoid using bridges altogether?

No - bridges are essential for cross-chain DeFi. But you should be selective. Use only bridges with transparent security practices, avoid moving large sums, and never trust marketing claims like "audited" or "secure." Check if they use formal verification, decentralized relayers, or IBC. If you can’t find that info, don’t use it.

What’s the future of bridge security?

The future is in standardized, decentralized protocols like IBC and CCIP, not custom-built bridges. Formal verification will become mandatory. AI will help find vulnerabilities before launch - but also help attackers find them faster. Regulatory pressure from bodies like ESMA will force higher standards. By 2026, 60% of current bridges may be replaced by more secure alternatives - if the industry acts now.